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“As It Is Africa, It Is Ok”? Ethical Considerations of
Development Use of Drones for Delivery in Malawi
Ning Wang
Abstract—Since 2016, drones have been deployed in various1
development projects in sub-Saharan Africa, where trials, tests,2
and studies have been rolled out in countries, including Tanzania,3
Uganda, Rwanda, Malawi, Ghana, and the Democratic Republic4
the Congo. The use cases of drones vary, ranging from imagery5
collection to transportation of vaccines, lab samples, blood prod-6
ucts, and other medical supplies. A wide range of stakeholders7
is involved, including governments, international organizations,8
educational institutions, as well as industry. Based on a field study9
conducted in 2019, this article investigates how drones are used10
for medical supply delivery in Malawi—a country where the com-11
munity is underserved for healthcare and related infrastructure12
underdeveloped, while airspace is largely open and regulations13
generally relaxed. The objective of presenting this case study is14
to contribute to the evidence regarding the rapid deployment of15
medical cargo drones across the African continent, and to spark16
critical reflections over the utility, suitability, and impacts of17
incorporating drones in the existing health supply chain systems18
in resource-poor settings. The discussion revolves around two19
aspects: 1) the emergent “African Drone Rise”—is it ok “as20
it is Africa”? and 2) the normative role of technology in the21
aid sector—is it “a solution looking for a problem”? In con-22
clusion, a call for more structured guidance for the systematic23
examination and evaluation of the medical cargo drone case is24
raised.25
Index Terms—Health supply chain system, humanitarian26




CCORDING to the World Bank, one-third of the30
world’s population lacks regular access to essential31
medicines [1]. The volume and complexity of global aid32
programs has spawned extensive and complex health sup-33
ply chains, many navigating difficult conditions in low- and34
middle-income countries with poor infrastructure, complex35
logistics, and lack of resources [2]. Although the humanitarian36
supply chain represents 60%–80% of humanitarian expendi-37
tures, last mile delivery (LMD) logistics is a critical constraint38
preventing medical supplies from reaching remote areas, caus-39
ing reported vaccines supplied to parts of the targeted countries40
to expire before they can be administered [3]. To address the41
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LMD challenge, the use of drones is considered useful to help 42
optimize the health supply chain, due to their technical ver- 43
satility, operational viability, and economic accessibility [4]. 44
Since 2014, several projects have demonstrated a proof of con- 45
cept of using drones for medical delivery [5]–[7]. Drone-based 46
healthcare projects have emerged rapidly across the globe 47
with a broad range of applications, especially prominent in 48
sub-Saharan Africa. 49
Although cargo drones used for development and health- 50
care purposes are still an emergent approach, there is a wide 51
array of actors involved ranging from tech start-ups to logis- 52
tics companies, many partnering with universities, NGOs, and 53
international aid organizations [3]. Yet due to the early stage 54
of implementation, to date, little real-world experience or 55
primary data related to technology performance, operations, 56
health impact, cost, or acceptability are available [5]. In addi- 57
tion, the trend of the “African Drone Rise” in recent years, 58
whereby drones and Africa are being construed as solutions to 59
each other’s problems, opens up critical questions with respect 60
to the ethical and societal implications of using drones in the 61
aid sector [9], [10]. This article constitutes one element of 62
a research project that examines technological innovation in 63
the aid sector and how it intersects with moral values, norms, 64
and commitments [11], [12]. As part of a set of field studies 65
of different uses of drones by international aid organizations, 66
this case study investigates the use of drones for medical sup- 67
ply delivery in the lake area of Malawi. A detailed narrative 68
account of the case study was presented in [4]. 69
The current paper draws upon the empirical findings of the 70
field study to develop an analysis with the goal of identify- 71
ing contextualized ethical considerations, and illuminating the 72
wider debate about how ethical technological innovation in 73
the aid sector can be operationalized. This article comprises 74
three parts: 1) a short summary of a case study of a medi- 75
cal drone delivery project, including a detailed presentation 76
of research methods; 2) an in-depth analysis of six cate- 77
gories of challenges that emerged in the context of the case 78
study: a) human and environmental safety; b) cargo safety; 79
c) operational costs; d) infrastructure gaps; e) local capac- 80
ity; and f) donor dependence; and 3) a discussion around the 81
phenomenon of the African Drone Rise, and the observed men- 82
tality of “solutionism,” in light of the concerns and critiques 83
raised by scholars and practitioners in the field. In conclu- 84
sion, I call for a prudent attitude in adopting novel technology 85
in the aid sector and argue that proposals for actionable eth- 86
ical standards to guide sector-wide innovation practices are 87
needed. 88
2637-6415 c© 2021 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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II. CASE STUDY89
A. Drone Delivery Project90
In 2017, the Government of Malawi (GoM) established the91
Humanitarian Drone Testing Corridor, in collaboration with92
a specialized UN agency, where studies could be implemented93
on using drones to facilitate LMD and integrating drones94
in an optimized health supply chain system in low-resource95
settings [5]. Since then, Malawi has become a popular site96
for drone testing and pilot projects [4]. In this case study,97
a donor agency attempted to find a solution to assist the GoM98
with the LMD challenge by transporting lab samples from99
the two islands in Lake Malawi—Likoma and Chizumulu—100
to the mainland, where land-based health logistics established101
by the Ministry of Health (MoH) are routinely used [4]. An102
organization, which is referred to as Y in our study, works in103
the area of public health and international aid, and is involved104
with selecting, procuring, and delivering medicines for infec-105
tious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, in Africa, Asia, and Latin106
America [4]. As drones showed potential to provide medical107
supplies to hard-to-reach areas, Y was eager to test if they108
could include drones in health logistics, and secured funding109
for a feasibility study [4]. The study was contracted to a com-110
pany with the objective to use drones to connect the health111
centers on the two islands to the mainland as a complementary112
supply chain solution [4]. Prior to the utilization of drones, the113
lab samples were transported by a passenger boat which oper-114
ates twice a week and takes about 6–8 h each way; with the115
drone, multiple deliveries per day can be performed, taking116
about just an hour each way, helping reduce the transportation117
time to a large extent [4]. In July 2019, upon receiving the118
final approval from the Department of Civil Aviation (DCA),119
the project entered into full operation [4]. According to the120
drone pilot interviewed, between July and October 2019, over121
200 flights were operated for more than 90 h and delivered122
about 45 kg of medical commodities over about 30 000-km123
flight route [4]. During this period, the project undertook rou-124
tine deliveries, reducing sample turnaround time from 5 to125
8 weeks with the boat to less than 4 weeks with the drone [4].126
The project was perceived as technically successful as it show-127
cased the state of the art of the technology, and achieved128
its intended outcome with respect to lab sample transporta-129
tion during the operation. However, there were also ethical130
challenges encountered in terms of safety, health impacts, cost-131
effectiveness, capacity, and sustainability [4]. An analysis of132
these challenges is provided in Section III.133
B. Research Methods134
1) Research Design: The case study was carried out in135
Malawi in October 2019 and February 2020, as part of a larger136
program investigating “value sensitive humanitarian innova-137
tion (VSHI)” and consisting of multiple case studies. The138
qualitative, interview-based research was conducted within139
a constructivist paradigm, in which human experience is under-140
stood as subjective, local, socially and experientially based,141
and culturally and historically specific [13]. Study design drew142
upon case study methodology, and we employed qualitative143
description as our methodological framework, which aims to144
gain first-hand knowledge of stakeholders’ experiences, and 145
describe their views and perceptions of a particular topic in 146
a language similar to their own [14], [15]. Our rationale of 147
using a qualitative description in this case study is to stay 148
especially close to the data itself, developing a low-inference 149
analysis by directly organizing and synthesizing data without 150
further interpretation [15]. 151
2) Participant Recruitment: We acquired and received the 152
Ethics Review Board approval from the National Commission 153
for Science and Technology of Malawi on 13 November 2019. 154
We then recruited interview participants using two approaches. 155
1) Guided by an interview plan, we sent email invita- 156
tions to targeted stakeholder representatives, which were 157
jointly identified by the research team and our local 158
partners. We recruited 12 individual participants, includ- 159
ing three development workers (at international and 160
national levels), one drone technician, six government 161
officials (at national ministerial and community levels), 162
and two health workers (at community level). We also 163
convened a focus group of local community members 164
(22 villagers in total). All of these participants were 165
involved in, experienced, or witnessed the drone delivery 166
project. 167
2) Following a snowball sampling logic, we recruited 168
eight further participants by recommendations of 169
previous participants, to expand the scope of the inves- 170
tigation and gain complementary and contextualized 171
data. 172
The further recruitment included one elected official, 173
five additional health workers, and two local drone techni- 174
cians. All of these participants were situated at the community 175
level and were directly involved in the drone project. The final 176
sample of 42 participants thus consisted of a diverse represen- 177
tation of stakeholders engaged in the drone delivery project, 178
consistent with our goal of maximum variation sampling in 179
order to explore the common and unique perspectives on the 180
subject [16]. 181
3) Data Collection: Our main data collection was semi- 182
structured qualitative interviews. All participants provided 183
written informed consent prior to their interview. Other 184
data sources included texts (e.g., publicly available reports), 185
and observations by the author (e.g., how interviewees inter- 186
acted with each other), who carried out the field study in 187
Malawi as the principal researcher. Two types of interviews 188
were conducted: 1) those that followed an interview guide, 189
which was developed prior to the field study with targeted 190
questions centered around key areas of ethical concerns, was 191
initiated based on expert knowledge and 2) open discussions 192
to explore topics which emerged from the earlier interviews 193
(e.g., the regulatory environment in Malawi, or the particulari- 194
ties of medical drone delivery in the African context). Overall, 195
12 interviews were conducted between 24 October 2019 and 196
12 February 2020, including eight individual interviews with 197
a single participant, three panel interviews with 2–5 partici- 198
pants each, and one focus group interview with 22 participants. 199
All interviews were conducted face-to-face and were audio- 200
recorded, ranging from 46 to 169 min in duration (average 201
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TABLE I
CATEGORIES OF ETHICAL CHALLENGE
in English; and the focus group interview with the community203
members was conducted in the local dialect, with translation204
provided by our local partner.205
4) Data Analysis: Data analysis consisted o two steps:206
1) generating validated descriptive summaries of the interviews207
and 2) extrapolating thematic categories for further analysis.208
For the first step, we developed a written synopsis of each209
interview, based on the interview recordings and with refer-210
ence to the available texts and observations, with the support211
of a research assistant. These synopses were compared with212
interview notes taken by the author during each interview,213
leading to a comprehensive descriptive summary of the inter-214
views. The summary was then sent to anonymous reviewers,215
who were involved in the drone delivery project, to ensure that216
it was factually accurate. This resulted in a detailed narrative217
account of the case study, which was presented in [4]. For the218
second step, core concepts were first developed by themes,219
and these themes were then clustered in six categories and220
extrapolated for analysis. Based on this inductive analysis, four221
aspects of ethical considerations were drawn in light of two222
key concerns: 1) the emergent African Drone Rise—is it ok “as 223
it is Africa”? and 2) the normative role of technology in the aid 224
sector—is it “a solution looking for a problem”? These find- 225
ings then led to the conclusion of lessons learned from three 226
aspects, namely, the technical, impact, and benefit-sharing per- 227
spectives, summarized in Table I. It is worth noting that these 228
themes represent a rather broad spectrum of challenges, includ- 229
ing technical aspects such as safety, and operational aspects 230
such as costs. Some of these aspects may not be ethical issues 231
per se such as infrastructure or capacity, or may not exclu- 232
sively relate to drones, such as patient data, but may nonethe- 233
less cause unintended consequences of ethical concerns, and 234
are in that sense considered as having an ethical impact. These 235
categories do not suggest a specific order of criticality and are 236
presented with a horizontal logic for ease of reading. 237
III. ANALYSIS OF ETHICAL CHALLENGES 238
While no severe ethical tensions, tradeoffs, or dilemmas are 239
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related to safety, operationality, and sustainability among the241
involved stakeholders. In the following sections, I provide242
a detailed analysis of how these themes were manifest in the243
case study, with references to the wider academic literature.244
A. Safety245
1) Human and Environmental Safety: First, the biggest risk246
for drone operation is the drone technology itself. The drone247
technology has inherent technical limitations—drones are bat-248
tery powered, and the more powerful the battery, the longer249
the distance, but also the heavier the payload, and the big-250
ger the drone, hence the more severe safety consequences in251
the case of a drone crash [11]. Take the drones used in this252
project for example: they can weigh up to 16 kg, can carry253
cargo up to 6 kg, and can take off and land in relatively small254
spaces without requiring infrastructure beyond visual line of255
sight (BVLOS) [17]. For short distances, or where no pickup256
is required at the destination site, the drone has the capability257
to drop packages without landing by hovering and releasing its258
cargo in a box. For longer distances, or where sample pickup259
is needed, the drone will need to land for a battery charge. In260
the case where the drone crashes, there will be a serious risk261
to human safety when flying over populated areas, or causing262
environmental damage when flying over the lake. According to263
the interview participants, at the time of the operation, Malawi264
did not have official safety regulations, which raised concerns265
for some stakeholders at the MoH. Although the operations266
team took precarious safety measures, it was reported that267
there had been accidents both within and outside of the Drone268
Corridor, and due to either mechanical or human errors [4].269
As the actual drone operations were not executed by the GoM,270
but by the drone manufacturers or service providers asso-271
ciated with international aid agencies, the safety challenges272
lie with them to overcome. Compared to manned aircraft,273
unmanned aircraft regulation is either nonexistent or fairly274
relaxed currently, making safety issues, including physical and275
environmental aspects worrisome.276
Another factor that causes safety concerns is the connec-277
tivity solution. According to experts, uninterrupted commu-278
nication between the drone and the control station is of279
paramount importance to ensure safety, as the drone needs280
to be monitored constantly and precisely from the ground281
station [18]. If the local mobile network is sufficiently estab-282
lished, then the drone can be continuously controlled using283
mobile data that covers the entire flight route. If such an infras-284
tructure is unavailable, then a customized communication plan285
needs to be set up, such as a combination of mobile network286
and satellite. In this project, the drones used in the opera-287
tion are semi-automatic and can vertically take-off and land,288
i.e., humans remotely control take-off and landing via mobile289
network, and then the control is surrendered to the onboard290
computer during the flight. When connectivity is lost, the291
drones would remain at its last known position and circle292
until connectivity would recover, during which time there is an293
increased likelihood of a crash or a so-called “hard-landing,”294
e.g., affected by wind or other weather conditions. Since the295
poor communication infrastructure in Malawi caused network296
interferences to drone navigation, the operations team had to297
triangulate between the GSM/LTE network with automatic 298
switch to satellite communications, when the former is absent, 299
to make sure that they would not lose the drone mid-air. As 300
the study indicates, this raised concerns among drone pilots 301
and involved community members that, if a drone would lose 302
connectivity when flying over the lake and fall into the water, 303
it would not only be difficult to locate and retrieve it, but car- 304
gos, including samples or medicines, would get lost. Although 305
satellite communications are the most reliable and with rela- 306
tively low costs in initiating the drone operations, technically 307
they are not the most optimal, and economically they lead to 308
higher costs during the operation in the long run [18]. This 309
challenges the proposed scalability of drone delivery in areas 310
where communication infrastructure is already fragile. 311
A third factor is the weather conditions. There are gen- 312
erally strong and lasting headwinds over Lake Malawi [4]. 313
Prior to the operation, the MoH had warned the project team 314
about the unfavorable weather conditions, and urged them to 315
take a cautious approach to verify the capability of the drone 316
to withstand strong winds, as well as to assess any poten- 317
tial environmental risks related to it. During the operation, 318
technical staff at the ground station would check the weather 319
and assess the air speed of the drone, on the basis of which 320
they would calculate the wind speed and decide whether they 321
should abort the flight mid-air. Still, the wind led to one crash, 322
causing the drone to fall directly into the lake. Weather con- 323
ditions during a flight can impact the success of a drone 324
mission, as inclement weather conditions or significant dif- 325
ferences in ambient temperatures may cause drones to lose 326
their functionality [19], [20]. The current state of technology 327
development does not allow the drone to calculate the flight 328
time itself, whereby it decides whether the fight time is more 329
than the maximum allowed flight time and to automatically 330
return. Granted that tracking systems may help locate the area 331
where the drone fell, and with the lay knowledge about the 332
current and waves of the lake, it may be possible to roughly 333
determine where the drone has gone. Granted too that there 334
may be ways of minimizing the potential risk of environmental 335
damage caused by cargo leakage, through secured cargo pack- 336
aging protocols. These risk mitigation measures, nonetheless, 337
do not reduce the inherent risk of drone accidents caused by 338
adverse weather conditions, or interrupted communications as 339
aforementioned. This raises the question as to whether drones, 340
especially smaller ones, suit the windy environment around 341
Lake Malawi. 342
A final factor is safety insurance which relates to all the 343
above three factors. It is important to note the fundamental 344
difference between manned or commercial aviation flights and 345
unmanned or drone flights with regard to insurance. In the for- 346
mer case, passengers actively accept the risk when they board 347
the flight, while in the latter case, those on the ground do 348
not have the opportunity to accept the risk prior to a drone 349
operation [21]. While the capability of drones in carrying pay- 350
load or handling wind is critical, it is equally important to 351
establish insurance policies to protect populations in the oper- 352
ation areas. According to the participating interviewees at the 353
MoH, ever since the first drone operator that came to Malawi 354
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even injured a villager,” they have witnessed constant changing356
of drones from one model to another, none with an insur-357
ance policy. They are of the view that as the Malawians never358
demanded drones, they are largely unaware of potential safety359
risks related to drones and need protections from the govern-360
ment. According to our interviews, expectations from both the361
health and the aviation sectors to establish drone insurance,362
ranging from injury of individuals to damage of leaked medi-363
cal supplies, is currently high in Malawi. In the absence of an364
insurance policy in Malawi, the GoM and the respective drone365
operators opted for signing a mutual agreement to settle the366
safety insurance aspect of the drone projects in question. Some367
stakeholders seemed to be inclined to downplay the ethical368
risks with a reductionist view, focusing solely on the “ethical369
conduct of business,” e.g., no bribery to regulatory author-370
ities, or no dealings with weaponized drone manufacturers.371
However, the often-overlooked unintended harmful conse-372
quences associated with the introduction of new technology373
may, in fact, be much more detrimental to vulnerable popu-374
lations and their living environment, no matter how “ethical”375
the conduct of the business may be.376
2) Cargo Safety: With respect to lab sample packaging,377
Malawi takes an approach whereby every blood sample taken378
is considered infectious until it is tested negative. To ensure379
cargo safety, the MoH adopts a so-called “three-layer” system.380
The first layer varies depending on the samples—in the case of381
a TB sample, the sputum is packaged in bottles with a screw382
top; in the case of an HIV sample, as it is dried blood sam-383
ples on absorbing papers, it is packaged in envelopes with384
seals. These samples are then kept in Ziploc bags, which is385
the second layer. They are then put in a bigger container made386
of hard plastic locked with a screw top, which is the third387
layer. This packaging system is designed to ensure that the388
person carrying the samples is protected, as is the environ-389
ment and the bystanders. In this project, the fully packaged390
samples are placed inside the cargo box, which is made of391
fiberglass and is attached to the bottom of the drone during392
the flight [17]. In principle, even if a drone would crash, the393
cargo box would remain intact, and the risk of sample spillage394
or leakage should be minimal. However, according to both the395
technical and health personnel interviewed, as the cargo box396
itself is not locked and can be opened with a magnet, in the397
case of a drone crash, the sealed bottles or envelopes may still398
fall out of the cargo box and be dispersed (although the actual399
samples may not be revealed unless someone picks them up400
and opens them). Since the drone pilots do not typically handle401
the samples, other than keeping track of what is being carried402
by the drone, and logging how many samples and which types403
of samples are being loaded into the drone, the drone opera-404
tors essentially provide a “postal service” using drones instead405
of ground vehicles. This leaves questions of responsibility for406
safety risks more complex, if and when there is sample leakage407
in the case of a drone accident.408
The importance of cargo safety related to dangerous goods409
in humanitarian aid and emergency response is strictly regu-410
lated by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)411
in its 2020 Guidance. In this document, ICAO focuses specif-412
ically on the safety risks, responsibilities, and mitigation413
measures related to potentially dangerous cargos carried by 414
drones [22]. The Guidance also provides technical definitions 415
of “dangerous goods,” and recommendations regarding their 416
handling, including detailed guidelines laid out in its four 417
Appendixes. According to the Guidance, examples of danger- 418
ous goods include infectious substances such as lab samples 419
for analysis, and toxic substances such as certain medicines or 420
chemical, among others [22]. It also affirms that in the case 421
of biological substances, pathogen data sheets or information 422
about the hazards of infectious substances, including deactiva- 423
tion and waste disposal, should be made available [22]. Given 424
that some of the cargo transported in this project was infectious 425
samples, such as TB sputum, as well as other potentially dan- 426
gerous chemical supplies, such as lab reagents used to run the 427
sample testing, losing cargo became the second biggest safety 428
concern of the health personnel across the MoH. The ICAO 429
Guidance classifies risks associated with the dangerous goods 430
transported by drones by levels, and recommends risks to be 431
assessed in relation to the consequence of their effects if they 432
are released [22]. It asserts that, in addition to normal flight 433
risks associated with operating routes, obstacles, altitudes, or 434
take-off and landing areas, special efforts must be made when 435
these goods are transported over populated areas, remote areas, 436
or environmentally sensitive land and waters [22]. As govern- 437
ments around the world are currently working on creating and 438
adapting legislation to ensure both safety and development 439
related to the humanitarian use of drones, the regulatory land- 440
scape evolves rapidly [3]. Although international development 441
work may not always take place in emergency situations, the 442
safety standards should still apply. 443
Closely related to sample packaging is the issue of patient 444
data. According to the interviewed health personnel involved 445
in sample packaging, the patient data related to the lab samples 446
in this project is personally identifiable, as the samples have 447
both patient name and a unique ID number on them. In addi- 448
tion, this data is also demographically identifiable, as there is 449
a facility code on the sample, as well as a laboratory requisi- 450
tion form which describes the test that needs to be performed 451
on the sample. This means that if the sample is revealed, it is 452
possible to link it with a particular patient who is associated 453
with a particular health facility. Patient confidentiality, there- 454
fore, is at risk of being compromised in the case of drone 455
accidents. In the U.S., for instance, medical drone delivery 456
operations must comply with the Health Insurance Portability 457
and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which is a set of regulations 458
established to protect the confidential and private information 459
of patients [20]. According to the Act, HIPAA may be vio- 460
lated if individuals who are not involved in the direct care 461
of patients view patient information on the labels of medical 462
specimens or medications [20]. In this project, the cargo to 463
be transported by the drone is entrusted to the involved health 464
and technical personnel. As the drone pilots receive the sample 465
in packages ready to be loaded into the drone, patient data is 466
handled separately from the drone operation and is collected 467
and processed within the involved health facilities. Concerns, 468
however, arose around potential data leakage as a result of 469
a drone accident. There may be a perception that patient con- 470
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traditional health supply chain solutions. Yet, it is noteworthy472
that there is a heightened risk of unintended harmful conse-473
quences caused by the frequency and height, as well as the474
scope of reach, of drone flights, compared to ground vehicles475
as the latter depend less on parameters, such as weather and476
mobile communication. This suggests that downplaying the477
severity of patient data risks associated with cargo drones is,478
at the least, an imprudent attitude.479
B. Operationality480
1) Infrastructure Gaps: Despite the media hype and indus-481
try excitement, drones are not the silver bullet to the health482
logistics system. For example, in emergency cases where483
patients on the islands need to be attended, unlike ambu-484
lances, drones cannot assist in the transportation of humans.485
Another example is the case of a drone crash, in which sit-486
uation the drone-based health supply chain would crash as487
well. According to the DCA, after a drone crash, the operation488
must be halted immediately while the technical team return-489
ing to the Drone Corridor, undertaking thorough technical490
checks, demonstrating revised flight strategy, and reapplying491
for approvals—a lengthy process different from traditional492
logistic solutions, such as boats or motorbikes. As happened in493
this project, routine sample delivery got interrupted when the494
drone crashed during the operation, and the local health facili-495
ties had to rearrange logistics, i.e., going back to the passenger496
boat. These aspects imply that to maintain a stable delivery497
service, the health facilities on the islands cannot rely solely498
on the drone, but would need an alternative that is somewhat499
more reliant, and that they can safely fall back on. As the study500
indicates, drones were useful to help with sample transporta-501
tion with an improved health outcome; the problem occurs502
when the operation got interrupted by, e.g., weather, connec-503
tivity, or drone accidents, in which cases the improvement504
achieved would be setback. The real issue here is not about505
choosing between drones or ground vehicles, but to ensure506
reliable and continued health logistic services. What remains,507
in the long run, is the underlying structural problems of the508
impoverished public health system in Malawi—had the GoM509
had more systemic solutions to resolve the LMD challenge in510
the health sector, drones would have unlikely appeared in their511
agenda in the first place. The dilemma is that such alternatives512
are not immediately present to Malawi.513
Another challenge relates to lab sample processing,514
which concerns the potential overburdening—as opposed to515
strengthening—of local health systems. The main factor for516
sample processing is the turnaround time, which is measured517
by the total running time (TRT) and classified as T1 (sample518
collecting), T2 (sample processing), and T3 (test result dis-519
semination). In theory, even though the use of drones does520
not change T2, the TRT still ends up shorter as a result of521
the reduced time of T1 and T3. Take the Central Molecular522
Lab (CML) of Malawi for example: in this project, although523
the CML received the same number of samples in total, the524
frequency of delivery has changed with the drone. This, to525
some degree, helps the lab to reduce the TRT, as there is now526
a more stable sample inflow compared to the past. On the flip527
side, however, there are other variables at play, which actually528
led to a prolonged TRT on some occasions. This is because, 529
since the drone delivery started, both the lab personnel and 530
equipment turned out to be insufficient, although the CML had 531
an increase of staff and a second platform installed in the lab. 532
With the two platforms, the lab personnel had to work days and 533
nights on double shifts to keep up with the increased inflow 534
of samples. Additionally, although the TRT has gone down 535
with a constant sample supply, reality suggests that with the 536
increase of samples, the lab has been significantly hampered 537
by insufficient consumables, e.g., lab reagents for biochemistry 538
tests or full blood counts. This is because Malawi has the so- 539
called “push system” in health consumables supply, and the 540
ongoing supply has not been adapted to the sudden demand 541
for lab consumables and is underdelivered. Furthermore, the 542
increased inflow of samples also hampered the machines them- 543
selves due to overworking, which caused some downtime to 544
the lab. As a result, to cope with the drone deliveries, the lab 545
would need more equipment to account for the number of sam- 546
ples coming in, and the same has to apply to the number of 547
staff and consumables. Looking from the big-picture perspec- 548
tive, drones offer a partial solution to a much more complex 549
problem. 550
The sample processing aspect is closely related to the health 551
facility capacity in remote areas of Malawi. Take HIV patients 552
for example: many who need to be treated for HIV are also 553
infected with TB. If a health facility needs to do an HIV viral 554
load test, they also should do a TB culture to understand how 555
the drugs are working to help with the management of the 556
same HIV patient. Unfortunately, donors such as those in this 557
project, have a desired focus on HIV, overlooking other interre- 558
lated causes that contribute to the patient’s overall conditions. 559
Presently, each district hospital in Malawi has a chemistry lab 560
that can do geneXpert, but only 3–4 labs across the whole 561
country can handle TB culture for a drug resistance case. 562
Yet, it is not immediately feasible for the MoH to drastically 563
improve lab facilities in remote areas, which would allow for 564
local testing of samples. Drones offer the MoH a solution to 565
the LMD challenge they are faced with, and give a sense of 566
relief to the health personnel on the islands. To overcome the 567
infrastructure barriers, the GoM implemented short- and long- 568
term measures. While long-term measures inevitably suggest 569
more budget at the central level, short-term measures give the 570
districts flexibility to use locums to cover the staff shortage. 571
Nevertheless, as Malawi already suffers from a general short- 572
age of health personnel, this measure hardly helps. As such, 573
just like the case of the CML, even if the MoH would be able 574
to install additional lab equipment in remote health facilities, 575
the lack of human resources is still a barrier hard to over- 576
come, let alone the lack of electricity and other material such 577
as the aforementioned lab consumables in those areas. The 578
question, hence, boils down to how to compensate the poor 579
infrastructure with an already-burdened health system. 580
2) Operational Costs: From the investment perspective, 581
the drone operation is an expensive venture as, to date, 582
most drone manufacturers are in start-up modes and are 583
still in the stages of research and development in the tech- 584
nology. The capital cost needed for operation is high, and 585
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are even higher, requiring a massive amount of resources587
to be invested [5], [8], [17]. Traditionally, supply chain man-588
agement systems account for the costs of device operation589
and maintenance, as well as transport time, road condition,590
warehousing, and staff [23]. The cost of adding drones to591
the supply chain will be determined not only by these mea-592
sures but also the unique drone-specific considerations [8].593
According to an FHI360 study, understanding the conditions594
under which drones are cost effective is critical, but it is a com-595
plex area for investigation [23]. First, the costs include both596
the cost of the technology and the cost of service provision.597
These cost models vary substantially depending on the specific598
system used as well as staff training to operate and maintain599
them [23]. Second, weather conditions are a big factor in drone600
operating costs. Knowing the impact of wind, humidity, eleva-601
tion, precipitation, and temperature on supply chain operations602
will be critical [23]. Third, in addition to direct costs gener-603
ated by the drone service, opportunity costs also play a role.604
On a system level, it is difficult to measure the value of faster605
turnaround times for lab test results, against the value of hav-606
ing a health provider remain in a facility for a day rather than607
transporting medical goods [23]. Presently, the cost effective-608
ness of using drones in the development context is largely609
unknown [5], [8]. Many donors across the globe have, there-610
fore, kept a vigilant attitude toward investing in medical cargo611
drones.612
From the beneficiary perspective, for resource-constrained613
countries like Malawi, the only way to run drone operations is614
relying on donor funds. In the case of Malawi, the drone opera-615
tions do not generate an additional budget for the health sector,616
and the MoH on its own cannot afford drones. In general, there617
is the question of how money should be spent in the health sec-618
tor. For most health personnel interviewed in our study, there619
is an overwhelming preference for improving the health facil-620
ity capacity in remote areas, to “flying this small thing around621
Malawi,” as some health workers sarcastically noted. They622
are of the view that rather than using the precious resources623
allocated to public health on drone operations, Malawi would624
be better-off procuring new lab equipment, or training more625
health workers in the long run. Not only do they perceive626
the drone operation as wasting resources but also the result627
of improper agenda setting at the central level. For the MoH,628
however, although drone operations cost a larger sum of funds,629
if it indeed proves to be cost effective in bringing better health630
outcomes, they are willing to seek donor funds and justify631
costs. In reality, due to the above-mentioned lack of knowl-632
edge on the actual costs of drone operations, most donors are633
currently still interested in testing a proof of concept by invest-634
ing in a pilot study to explore the operational feasibility. These635
projects tend to be short term from a few days to a few weeks,636
of experimental nature, with predefined objective and method-637
ology, and managed by international operations teams [4].638
Although the future of medical cargo drones is promising, the639
immediate challenge comes down to the cost of running the640
service on the ground in resource-constrained environments.641
Hence, the beneficiary governments need to carefully review642
the long-term costs to assess if drones indeed make sense to643
their particular contexts.644
The challenge on the system level also relates to the so- 645
called business model of medical cargo drones across Africa. 646
As the current practices suggest, there are different donors and 647
healthcare providers independently conducting drone opera- 648
tions in different countries [5], [8]. From a knowledge build- 649
ing perspective, some of these projects can be complementary 650
to each other, in terms of types of drones used (parachuting 651
or vertically take-off/landing), modes of delivery chosen (one- 652
way dropping or bidirectional pick-up/dropping), flight routes 653
defined (long- or short-distance), etc. [5]. Still, working in silos 654
may potentially create competition over attention, resource, 655
agenda setting, and even the airspace. Countries like Malawi, 656
where health systems are already fragile, need a healthy and 657
sustainable environment to incubate innovation. In addition, 658
drone development, impact evaluation, and final implementa- 659
tion require longer-term investment with funds that go beyond 660
pilot projects [5], [17]. This leaves a large investment space 661
for the private sector, where venture capital funds are avail- 662
able to enable the technical robustness needed. However, it is 663
worth noting that cost-effectiveness analysis may not be the 664
top priority for such investors, as they may not be seeking 665
cost-effective interventions; but rather, are keener on finding 666
out how to operate drones on the ground in the development 667
space, and how to integrate this technology into an existing 668
supply chain while the operational costs continuing to decrease 669
as the technology further matures [24]. Ultimately, it is up to 670
the national governments to assess their needs, conduct cost- 671
effectiveness analysis, and gauge in between various tradeoffs 672
that are particular to their own contexts. 673
C. Sustainability 674
1) Local Capacity: The key for the GoM to integrate drones 675
in the existing supply chain system, in the long run, is the issue 676
of locally based operation. To keep operations local, human 677
resources, including trained remote pilots, drone operators, 678
and technical project managers, are essential. Take BVLOS 679
for example: there is an increased risk in these applications 680
as human control is minimum, and the drones rely primarily 681
on computer systems [19], [20]. Specialized pilots with tech- 682
nical skills, including both knowledge and experience, such as 683
uploading flight plans in the case of an inconsistent mobile 684
network, are needed. These pilots are costly, and are typically 685
unwilling to stay for a long period of time, due to their unfamil- 686
iarity with the challenging operational environments. Although 687
Malawi has some capacity to fly drones, the GoM has not yet 688
been able to systematically develop such capacity. In the con- 689
text of this project, there was an agreement between the GoM 690
and the operators that, once the testing proves to be success- 691
ful, they will have Malawian pilots trained locally in order to 692
ensure the sustainability of the project. This, unfortunately, had 693
not yet taken place, as the project was still in the early phase 694
at the time of our study. Battery charging and cargo loading 695
offer two more examples. Health personnel may have a role 696
in loading/unloading a drone, confirming schedules, securing 697
a landing or dropping site, documenting deliveries, and even 698
launching the drone—each would require training and time [8]. 699
If drone operations were to be scaled in Malawi, existing health 700
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reality, however, the MoH saw that the donors came in with702
their own operations teams, and few health personnel have703
been trained so far. It remains unclear whether, and if so when,704
the GoM will be able to build the local capacity to manage the705
technical processes independently—how many batteries they706
will need to manage, who will handle the technical problems707
associated with loading cargos in drones, and how they will708
organize the maintenance of the drones in case of mechanical709
errors or crashes, etc.710
The drone operation is a combination of the technicalities711
of the drone and project management knowledge, includ-712
ing especially the implementation of the drone operation in713
resource-constrained environments. The management of drone714
operations involves complex planning, including landscape715
research, identifying the country, designing the activity, suc-716
cessful procurement, contracting, stakeholder management,717
and getting approvals for flights. Additional aspects include718
hiring local staff, getting buy-in from local communities, sen-719
sitizing local communities, creating communication processes720
with medical staff for deliveries and pick up, as well as over-721
all management of the budget and subcontractors. Similarly,722
testing, licensing, and certification of drones need to be done723
and need to be streamlined and made local and affordable.724
In countries where technical resources and human capacity725
are limited, such as in Malawi, an international drone service726
provider may present a valuable option during an initial phase.727
Ultimately, local capacity needs to be strengthened as drone728
service providers can be costly, and might not always be able729
to deliver the optimal solution for every setting [25]. For sus-730
tainable in-country drone operation and its maintenance in the731
long run, local capacity building is a critical factor and should732
be demanded by governments, facilitated by implementers,733
and supported by donors [26]. As with any innovative health734
intervention, the sustainability of drone-supported healthcare735
systems will further necessitate strong capacity building, an736
efficient impact monitoring and evaluation cycle, as well as737
in-country commitment, including investment in drone reg-738
ulations, project design, and long-term ownership [5]. This739
involves multistakeholder consultation, and potentially the740
development of new regulations which, again, implies costs741
as well as the need for local capacity.742
With respect to airspace management, the touchy issue743
of drone regulation is at play. Air space is highly regu-744
lated by civil and international aviation authorities, especially745
with respect to manned aircraft where air space regulation746
is currently much more established than in the unmanned747
space. Although drones fly at much lower altitudes than748
most manned aircraft, all aircraft pass through low-altitude749
space, thereby requiring coordination. For drones, techni-750
cal issues relate to battery life, payload capacity, and the751
ability to detect and avoid any problems from the control752
station. Safety and security issues include the drone’s abil-753
ity to avoid near misses, collisions, and accidents as well754
as hijacking and espionage [19], [20]. Administrative issues755
related to drone operator training and licensing and the service756
provider’s legal compliance, fiscal health and compliance, and757
service costs [19], [20]. To achieve continued growth in drone758
applications, drones must meet or exceed the requirements759
specified in each of these regulatory areas [19]. Regulators 760
should therefore think beyond borders and in the longer-term 761
about the need for integrating drones in the existing logistics 762
systems in general [5], [8]. Like many countries in the world, 763
Malawi did not have drone-specific regulations at the onset. 764
Through a lengthy process of learning, Malawi started its own 765
regulation development in 2016, and now has drone pilots who 766
are not only certified to fly drones, but are involved in drafting 767
national drone regulations. However, as the main focus at the 768
DCA is manned aircrafts, drones create an additional job for 769
the staff, requiring dedicated manpower to supervise. In civil 770
aviation, there is undefined global authority—ICAO acts as 771
a facilitator and coordinator, while governments expect ICAO 772
to take a lead with standards, following what they have done 773
with manned aircrafts. However, due to a lack of prior experi- 774
ence with drones, ICAO is also learning from the industry and 775
seeking help with setting up the appropriate procedures glob- 776
ally. In the long run, airspace governance for drones will need 777
to address the interlinked issues of safety, privacy, account- 778
ability, and sovereignty. To this end, ICAO and governments 779
will have to anticipate future uses of the drone technology, 780
including humanitarian, development, and healthcare applica- 781
tions, taking into consideration the interests of a broad array 782
of stakeholders [1]. 783
2) Donor Dependence: For countries like Malawi, govern- 784
ments need committed resources, both human and financial, 785
to improve infrastructure and provide services to their citi- 786
zens. Traditionally, if the GoM identifies needs and gaps, they 787
will approach donors and solicit funds, donors will then evalu- 788
ate their “aid-worthiness” and allocate funds accordingly. This 789
leaves the GoM in a conundrum: for donor-funded projects, 790
the donors direct what they want to do with their funds, decide 791
which issue or location to tackle, and whether to commit fur- 792
ther funds or withdraw—all of which are beyond the reach 793
of the GoM. Even when donors partner with the MoH, such 794
as in this project, the MoH is not in the position to nego- 795
tiate possibilities regarding how to allocate resources. If the 796
donor chooses HIV, then malaria is out of the scope, even 797
if there may be bigger needs [27]. And if the donor funds 798
run out, then the project ends, even if the health outcome 799
would be setback and those that are involved would be neg- 800
atively impacted. In the case of this project, unlike mainland 801
Malawi where land-based health supply chains are available, 802
interruption of donor funds would be especially harsh for the 803
villagers on the islands, and the seemingly improved patient 804
care may well become a once-in-a-life-time experience. Take 805
cargo drones for example: the payload of a drone must make 806
not only technical but also economic sense; otherwise, flying 807
a drone would not be dissimilar to flying a manned aircraft. As 808
the drone technology has evolved, challenges have arisen as 809
regards aligning technology partners with stakeholder needs. 810
How to ensure that drone applications will address relevant 811
problems by teams who understand both the technicalities of 812
the technology and the local contexts remains a challenge [8]. 813
The rise of medical cargo drones in Malawi has its structural 814
roots because the existing problems are multifaceted—some 815
are location targeted, others are issue targeted; consequently, 816
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suffering. Malaria, for instance, is an issue across sub-Saharan818
Africa; HIV has been prevalent since the 1980s till today and819
is bound to stay. According to the interview participants, the820
health sector of Malawi receives a lot of innovation initiatives821
from donors, and as long as they help improve the health822
system and potentially save lives, the MoH would support823
them. At the same time, there has been an outcry among the824
District Health Officers that, sometimes, the donors “want to825
do what they want and not what we want.” The ideal way of826
addressing the health challenges of Malawi should be district827
mapping according to respective health needs, driven by the828
MoH. In reality, however, when donors come to Malawi, they829
may come with their own ideas regardless of the particular830
conditions and capacity at the local level. Since it is addi-831
tional resources which will assist in one way or another, the832
GoM seizes the funding opportunity. And when those initia-833
tives are to be implemented, the decisions may have already834
been made at, and passed through, the central level. Districts835
may not be informed prior, or consulted about which donors836
are needed, and which areas are to be supported. Given its837
poor infrastructure and a lack of local capacity, to what extent838
drones can really offer a solution to tackle these intersec-839
tional and complex systemic problems of Malawi remains840
to be seen.841
One reason leading to donor hesitance in committing to842
long-term investment in medical cargo drones is the lack of843
knowledge about the outcomes of various pilot projects. The844
health supply chain challenges of Malawi are cross-cutting845
issues. Donors across the globe look at what health impacts846
drones could really make, and whether local health capacity847
may actually be strengthened by introducing drones, within the848
time frame of operations [24]. According to the interviewed849
MoH personnel, since not even one project has made signifi-850
cant impact in Malawi so far, perceptions of donors regarding851
what drones are capable of, and whether drone operations are852
indeed “aid-worthy,” have been negatively affected. In terms853
of the scalability of drones in countries like Malawi, it will be854
dependent on a few factors: 1) the availability of local skills,855
which is essential because the current experience shows that856
maintaining the international staff in Malawi is neither fea-857
sible nor cost effective; 2) the evidence of value creation of858
adding drones to the existing health supply chain systems,859
which requires a solid monitoring and evaluation framework860
that could track progress; and 3) the maturity and cost of the861
technology itself, as currently there are important drone parts862
that cannot be manufactured locally and have to be imported,863
the purchasing, maintaining, and repairing of the drone can864
thus be burdensome. And finally, the question about the busi-865
ness sense in manufacturing, which depends on the use case866
and whether there is a business opportunity. The global drone867
community has a culture of optimism—people see a few tests868
and assume that everything is figured out; but there is actu-869
ally still a lot more to understand. Until these questions are870
answered, unless there is some donor who firmly believes871
in the technology and decides to invest in massive scalabil-872
ity regardless, the overoptimistic scenario where the operation873
costs will get lower and local skilled labor becomes available874
for running drones would be far-fetched.875
IV. DISCUSSION 876
It is often perceived that the biggest international develop- 877
ment challenge is the aid sector itself, as everything is based 878
on donors; yet the interconnectedness among, and the com- 879
plexity of, human development issues are not always fully 880
recognized by donors working in the development space [27]. 881
Beneficiaries would expect that if donors are providing a ser- 882
vice, they would continue providing it without interruptions. 883
Such a perception commonly exists in projects involving donor 884
funds, which can be decreased or discontinued. There is, 885
hence, the risk that expectation and dependence are created, 886
while services fail to deliver due to operational reasons and 887
donor preferences and their funding behavior [27]. Reality 888
requires development actors creating a system that benefits 889
populations in need, while keeping in mind that projects are 890
determined by funding and may come to an end. The fact 891
that donor funds may exhaust, and projects may terminate— 892
sometimes after people have got used to the benefits—may not 893
be an ethical issue in itself, but it is a limitation that the devel- 894
opment sector faces historically [27], [28]. In the case of med- 895
ical cargo drones, the discussions have been that if the drones 896
are used to bring medical supplies to populations in need, then 897
such innovation helps generate greater public good. Traditional 898
means of transportation do not involve innovation, but they 899
can also create dependence, can cause potential risks, and can 900
fail to deliver. Therefore, giving a chance to demonstrate the 901
potentials of drones as an alternative to the existing health 902
logistics does add value. This may be true to some degree; 903
the danger, however, is that in the development sector, people 904
often look for shortcuts and drones provide such an option [9]. 905
The least-developed countries across the world have the same 906
challenge of lack of development of infrastructure. In Africa, 907
the biggest challenge tends to be roads, which fuels the nar- 908
rative that “Africa needs more drones than roads” [9]. As this 909
case study illustrates, Malawi has its unique environments that 910
other countries do not have, some of which are in favor of 911
using drones (e.g., government support and health need), oth- 912
ers are disadvantageous (e.g., mobile connectivity and weather 913
conditions). This raises the question as to whether drones 914
indeed offer an appropriate solution for countries like Malawi 915
in the first place, which currently has no existing guidance 916
for decision makers to refer to when developing innovation 917
strategies. 918
With respect to public acceptability of innovation, there 919
are three levels to it: 1) the donors—how much they truly 920
believe in the technology, and what tradeoffs they perceive; 921
2) the local government—how risk averse they are, and how 922
they could benefit based on rational calculations; and 3) the 923
community—how much they understand new technology, and 924
how they associate it with local beliefs, norms and values. 925
For donors, when a new technology is introduced, they assess 926
whether it offers solutions to existing problems, how best to 927
utilize it as a tool to benefit public health or development, what 928
makes sense, and what is a waste of the resources. For local 929
governments, although there are issues around resource avail- 930
ability and local capacity, innovation is generally welcomed, 931
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communities, they need to be actively engaged in the process,933
starting from an accurate understanding about the potential934
risks of the technology to be introduced. In terms of drones,935
as there is not much experience anywhere in the world, the936
business model for drones is not yet clear [5], [8]. Is it better937
to outsource drone services to the private sector, or to build938
in-house capacity within implementing organizations? What939
sort of monitoring and evaluation systems are needed? These940
questions call for practical guidance to facilitate decision mak-941
ing. Although the indicators of success are unlikely to change942
with the introduction of drones, measuring how performance943
changes around the introduction of this new technology in944
particular settings will be key to understand its value [8]. As945
technology evolves, the general public’s understanding of how946
things work evolves, and the government’s tolerance and will-947
ingness to give approvals evolves as well. Just as with anything948
else, the more experience and exposure people have to new949
technology, the more familiarity with it they develop, and the950
better equipped they are to understand the nuances, the sug-951
gested benefits, as well as the potential risks—which may or952
may not cause actual problems, but the awareness of them is953
crucial. Although drone delivery is likely to advance quickly954
over the next few years, it remains unclear whether, outside955
of limited delivery of small payload of medical supplies, there956
is a clear case for drones to be deployed specifically to assist957
international aid [10].958
Regarding the technology experimentation aspect, a lot of959
innovation initiatives have been proposed to Malawi in the960
name of study or testing. Some were rejected by the GoM,961
others were pushed on and got implemented in different dis-962
tricts. In our study, interviewees from the health sector raised963
questions around why “testing things out on Malawians before964
giving it to others,” why accepting it when “they make their965
need our need,” and why not insisting that “we want something966
that we want.” While acknowledging the importance of foreign967
aid, they were disappointed about “feeling powerless because968
we are poor,” and wished to have the “do not impose but ask”969
approach. For decades, Malawi has been a relatively “free”970
space—not just for drones but for development projects in971
general [27], [28]. Countries like Malawi are receptive to aid972
because there are needs and gaps everywhere, rendering them973
particularly vulnerable to “solutions,” including those that are974
looking for a problem. The involvement of the tech sector in975
the development world may not necessarily be negative, but976
the emphasis should be on a careful and holistic approach,977
such that beneficiary countries can be truly empowered by978
the proposed innovation, and can actually manage its appli-979
cations in their own capacity. Government institutions play980
a critical role in facilitating project approval, negotiating with981
regulatory bodies and ministries, and coordinating a country982
approach among all health stakeholders even in cases where983
domestic funding cannot be provided [5]. After all, drones can984
be disruptive in both good and bad ways. In a positive sense,985
their introduction can potentially break down existing barri-986
ers between departments who previously worked in silos, and987
help integrate the health supply chain systems through coor-988
dinated efforts. The tension lies between insider and outsider989
tactics in the use of drones—policymakers and innovators alike990
should engage in a broad and inclusive discussion about how991
principles might be best balanced, as public accountability is 992
humanitarianism’s corner stone [8]. Ultimately, aid provision 993
is not about drones, but about being able to serve populations 994
in need. Challenges arise as to how best to engage the pri- 995
vate sector, which lacks well-thought-through guidance in its 996
current state of development. 997
The drone industry expansion from the civilian space to 998
the humanitarian and development world, where drones cre- 999
ate a significant new market while potentially adding value 1000
such as delivering medicines, has been aggressive in recent 1001
years [10], [29]. As the industry eyes civilian applications for 1002
its products, it is likely that governments, as well as aid agen- 1003
cies, will be subject to extensive lobbying efforts, including 1004
both the procurement of the so-called “humanitarian drones” 1005
and the push for the inclusion of it as part of international 1006
engagements [30]. Humanitarian and development organiza- 1007
tions must, therefore, carefully consider the practical, ethical, 1008
and legal implications of these developments. In terms of 1009
tradeoffs, would the cost of the drones divert resources from 1010
a better use? Do drones represent a risk to affected popula- 1011
tions, which is at least as great as the risk to be eliminated by 1012
the health sector? Will drones remove work from, or create 1013
additional work to, people who are currently in the work- 1014
force? How would drones, as well as the aid organizations 1015
behind them, be perceived by locals who may have hardly 1016
or may even have negative experiences with, flying object? 1017
How would they experience routine flights over their village 1018
or their houses and heads? Would it be something culturally 1019
acceptable or accepted with hostility? How will the drone 1020
industry contribute to building the interdisciplinary capacity as 1021
many seemingly unrelated sectors could actually be affected? 1022
These questions, again, call for actionable guidance, which 1023
needs to be evaluated against a comprehensive needs assess- 1024
ment regarding existing resources and bottlenecks in the health 1025
supply chain system and associated issue areas. The com- 1026
plexity of health logistics in low-resource settings requires 1027
dedicated stakeholder engagement, and the drone industry is 1028
an integral part of it. This is not only the responsibility of 1029
a government but also the industry should make strides in the 1030
analysis of demand and the network of the issues of concerns 1031
as well—before proposing and initiating a drone project. 1032
V. CONCLUSION 1033
While the defense and intelligence sectors were the early 1034
adopters of drones, the development sector, along with the 1035
commercial sector, has begun to leverage the technology to 1036
reach the hard-to-reach. To counteract the negative percep- 1037
tion of drones and avoid the more stringent regulations in the 1038
Global North, Africa has become a hotspot for the drone indus- 1039
try to develop technology and to obtain legitimacy [9], [31]. 1040
Most development programs utilizing drones in the health 1041
sector aim to supplement the traditional health logistics in 1042
geographically challenging areas and low-resource environ- 1043
ments, through collaboration with governments, the private 1044
sector, and international organizations [30]. As the drone tech- 1045
nology advances, it is likely that the use of drones for 1046
logistics in global health will become increasingly viable 1047
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technology can potentially add value to enhance health sup-1049
ply chain performance, improve access to health services,1050
and create greater public health outcomes. As the aid sector1051
embraces innovation, it opens up a unique space for technol-1052
ogy, which may be deployed with a “solutionist” mentality1053
by aid organizations [4], [11], [12]. Whether these innova-1054
tion proposals can substantively solve the actual problems1055
of the countries they intend to serve, in a sustainable man-1056
ner and in the long run, remains to be further examined1057
and elucidated. As proposed in this article, ultimately, the1058
key lies with ensuring rigorous reflections about the ethical1059
challenges technological innovation may invoke, developing1060
responsive methodologies to assess its potential for harms1061
relative to potential for benefits, and establishing actionable1062
ethical guidance to identify, address, and tackle such chal-1063
lenges. Following these insights, future work should strive to1064
establish a humanitarian innovation framework that is value-1065
sensitive and context specific, and geared toward determining1066
practical courses of action to address these concerns.1067
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